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CPYRGHT Hopeless

Last month there was quite a furor in the United States over a confidential memorandum submitted by Willard Matthias, a top CIA official. The press accused him of questioning Washington's ability to win the war in South Viet-Nam. Many wondered: whence this defeatism in a senior intelligence officer?

Now everything has been made clear. The CIA's reputation as an instigator and generator of cold war has been fully re-established.

Richard Dudman, Washington correspondent of the St-Louis Post Dispatch, obtained a copy of the memorandum. Its purpose, he says, was to induce the government to expand CIA operations. What Matthias proposes (according to Dudman) is carefully camouflaged subversion in Asia, Africa and Latin America, instead of outright military intervention as in South Viet-Nam.

"In many places," the memorandum says, "the situation may be so soft. the issues so undefined, and the parties so difficult to identify that outside powers will be unable to develop an acceptable rationale for intervention. Thus, many situations will be resolved by local leaders or groups sponsored and supported covertly from the outside. This will be an attractive course of action, not only because of the inhibitions upon intervention, but because it will often cost so little in money and effort if an investment is made early enough to be effective." '

Matthias leaves out of account a very pertinent and important factor: in Asia, Africa and Latin America the number of "local leaders or groups" prepared to act as paid CIA agents and follow its "attractive course of action" is rapidly diminishing. Besides, in many of these coun-